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V

ARGUMENT
I.

AN UNLAWFUL EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPROPRIATE WATER CAN INJURE OR
ADVERSELY AFFECT OTHER WATER USERS' CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
WATER RIGHTS.
The Defendants rest their entire defense of the summary judgment

on one leg, and one leg only:

the water rights of other users from the

same water source cannot conceivably be harmed by any decision or
proceeding of the State Engineer "under any scenario advanced," (Br. of
Appellees at 21 n.5), including extension request proceedings.

The

Defendants assert this position no less than 38 times in a 43-page
brief.
this

Defendants summarily proclaim, "The statutes and policies of

State, which are based on the prior appropriation doctrine,

demonstrate that the water rights of other persons are not at risk or
adversely

affected

Appellees at 15.)

in an extension request proceeding."
Defendants are wrong.

(Br. of

They are wrong in theory.

And they are particularly wrong under the facts of this case.

If this

Court were to follow Defendants' argument to its logical conclusion,
the legislature could constitutionally dispense with even the minimal
notice by newspaper publication of any State Engineer proceeding and
deny water users the right to protest with constitutional impunity.
A.

This Court Must Assume That Mr. Longley's Water Rights Were
Adversely Affected by the State Engineer's Unlawful Approval
of Leucadia's Belated Fifth Extension Request.

Upon review of a summary judgment, which "is generally considered
a drastic remedy," Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993),
the Court must view the facts in a light most favorable to finding a
material issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment, Jackson v.
Righter. 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995).

75837 L0589 001
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Under this standard, this Court

must assume that Mr. Longley's water rights were, in fact, adversely
affected by the extension approval.

Mr. Longley repeatedly alleged

that his water rights were adversely affected by the State Engineer's
decision.

(R. 159, 172.)

Mr. Longley asserted

in an affidavit

attached to his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Leucadia's Motion
for Summary Judgment that his property rights were adversely affected
by being excluded from the subject proceeding.

(R. 353.)

Counsel for

Mr. Longley again asserted at the hearing that Longley's water rights
were adversely affected by being shut out of the extension proceeding.1
None of the Defendants ever contested before the trial court that Mr.
Longley's

water

rights

were,

in

fact, adversely

affected

by

his

inability to participate in and oppose the untimely Fifth Extension
Request and the State Engineer's subsequent unlawful approval of it.
Therefore, this Court must assume, for purposes of summary judgment
that Mr. Longley's water rights were, in fact, adversely affected by
the unlawful extension approval.

1

THE COURT:
All right.
Mr. Smith, you're the responding
party and you say there are justiciable
issues of fact.
MR. SMITH:
Well, more than that, Your Honor, there's
important constitutional issues that they want you to brush aside
and ignore. This is a property interest. We are going to be
affected in a property interest if we're not allowed to be heard
before the State Engineer.
•

•

•

[0]ur property interest is being affected and I can read you all
the cases. (R. 564.)
•

•

*

I don't think there's anything that's a more valuable property in
this state than water. Location is everything. How close their
wells are to your wells, that's everything. And whether there's
going to be interference with your property or not. (R. 565.)

75837 L0589 001
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B.

Defendants are Wrong in Theory -- The Statutes and Policies
of Utah Demonstrate That the Water Rights of Other Persons
Are at Risk or Adversely Affected in an Extension Request
Proceeding•

The Defendants are forced to take the drastic position that no
matter what the facts, Mr. Longley's property interests cannot be
adversely affected by a decision of the State Engineer.

Thus, to avoid

a disputed issue of material fact, Defendants attempt to have this
Court

resolve,

as

a

matter

of

law,

the

issue

of

whether

a

constitutional deprivation could have taken place by making the broad
assertion that the water rights of users from the same water source
cannot conceivably be harmed by any decision of the State Engineer
"under any scenario advanced."

(Br. of Appellees at 21 n.5.)

However,

adoption of Defendants' position by this Court would have disastrous
consequences,

drastically

altering

constitutional

law and water

well-settled

law. The

statutes

principles

and

of

court-adopted

policies of this state, based on the prior appropriation doctrine,
demonstrate that the water rights of other persons are

at risk or may

be adversely affected in an extension request proceeding.

2.

The legislature
has recognized that the water rights of
other persons are at risk or can be adversely
affected
in an extension request
proceeding.

Defendants' broad assertion that the water rights of other persons
are

not

at

risk

or

adversely

affected

in

an

extension

request

proceeding has superficial appeal but leaves a number of troubling and
unanswered

questions.

First,

if

there

truly

is

"zero

risk"

of

deprivation in an extension request proceeding, (Br. of Appellees at
18) , then why has the legislature required published notice of the

75837 L0589 001
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application and proceeding?
designed

only

to solicit

Second, if notice by publication is truly
input

from the general

public,

(Br. of

Appellees at 26), then why is the scope of publication limited to the
county in which the water source is located; shouldn't it be published
basin-wide, or even state-wide, if notice by publication is a mere
public

input

or

public

relations

gesture?

Third,

if

only

the

applicant's water rights are at risk of deprivation in an extension
request

proceeding,

legislature

given

application?

(Br. of Appellees

water

users

the

at

right

13) , then
to protest

why
an

has

the

extension

Fourth, if no other person's water rights are or can be

adversely affected by an extension request proceeding, then why has the
legislature explicitly recognized that extension request protestants
can be "aggrieved by an order of the state engineer" and provided a
process whereby extension request protestants
review by

following

the procedures

Administrative Procedures Act]"?
(emphasis added).
In

light

of

"may obtain judicial

and requirements

of

[the Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(1) (a) (1989)

(See also Br. of Appellee's Part I.)
the

canons

of

statutory

construction

that

any

interpretation rendering parts of a statute superfluous be avoided,
State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d

311, 312

(Utah 1995), and that

statutory

provisions are presumed to have been used advisedly, Carlie v. Morgan,
922 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1996), Defendants failed to answer these questions.
First,

the

legislature

requires

of

the

application and proceeding to satisfy the demands of due process.

The

core goal of due process is fairness.
1207,

1211

(Utah 1983).

published

notice

See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d

But Defendants' argument

that notice by

publication is designed only to solicit public input, when taken to its
75837 LO589.001
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logical end, means that the State Engineer could dispense with such
notice without offending that constitutional objective.

If this Court

follows Defendants' reasoning, the legislature could, with this Court's
pre-approval, rewrite the state's water code to eliminate any notice
requirements whatsoever.

However, notice is not merely a "feel-good"

public relations ploy but is the "minimum

constitutional precondition

to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property
interests of any party. "

Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S.

791, 800 (1983) (emphasis added).

The legislature infused the water

code with notice requirements because it recognized that the State
Engineer's decisions can adversely affect others' property interests.
Second, notice by publication is not designed solely to solicit
input from the "general public" because the scope of publication is
limited to a newspaper in the county in which the water source is
located and the right to protest an extension application is limited to
water users.

See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (2) (g) (1997 Supp.).

Not

only has the legislature historically recognized that the water rights
of

other persons

are

at

risk

of being

adversely

affected

by

an

extension request proceeding, it has most recently recognized that the
water rights of other persons taking water from the same source of
supply are the only

rights at risk of being adversely affected.2

water users may not protest an extension application.
§ 73-3-12 (2) (g) (1997 Supp.).

Non

Utah Code Ann.

Accordingly, in order to inform this

2

Compare Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (2) (g) (1997 Supp.) (limiting
the right to protest an extension to water users from the same water
source) with Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (1) (f) (1989) (any person may
protest the extension).
75837 L0589 001
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select group of water rights holders, notice of an extension request is
required to be published only "in a newspaper of general circulation in

the county

in which the source

is to be used."

of supply

is located

and where the water

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (2) (f) (I) (A) (1997 Supp.)

(emphasis added). 3

By giving only water users from the same water

supply notice of and the right to protest an extension, the legislature
has explicitly debunked Defendants' claims that the statutory notice
requirements are merely designed to encourage input from the public.
Third and fourth, the legislature has given water users the right
to

protest

application

an

extension

as an

application

and

appeal

approval

"aggrieved party" because, as set

of

the

forth below,

extensions can adversely affect other water users from the same source
of supply and, therefore, those water users have the right to be heard.
The Utah legislature has explicitly recognized that extension request
protestants can be "aggrieved by an order of the state engineer" and
has provided

a process whereby extension request protestants

"may

obtain judicial review by following the procedures and requirements of
[the Utah Administrative Procedures Act]"?
14(1)(a) (1989).

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-

Defendants concede this (Br. of Appellees at 10-11),

but then argue that the water rights of other users from the same water
source cannot

conceivably be harmed by any decision of the State

Engineer "under any scenario advanced," (Br. of Appellees at 21 n.5).

3

This was true under the pre-1997 version of the statute, as
well. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(1) (e) (i) (1989) (emphasis added)
("The state engineer shall publish notice once each week for three
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county
in

which

the source

75837 L0589 001

of supply

is

located.'1)
6

Defendants'

inconsistent

position

is

that

a

person

can

be

adversely affected or aggrieved by a decision of the State Engineer
only

if he

files a timely protest

and becomes

a party,

(Br. of

Appellees Part I ) ; but if, for some reason, the state fails to provide
adequate notice of a proceeding, thereby causing a water user's failure
to protest,

(R.

affected

aggrieved

or

353-54),
by

that water user will not be
the

State

Engineer's

decision,

adversely
(Br. of

Appellees Part II) . Such gainsaying should not eclipse the legislative
recognition that the State Engineer's decisions can leave a person
"aggrieved" and in need of an appeal.

Utah Code Ann. §73-3-14(1)(a).4

4

Defendants' argument is severely flawed and disingenuous for
other reasons. For example, Defendants assert that Mr. Longley's right
to protest and subsequent cause of action to appeal a decision of the
State Engineer are not within the bundle of protected property
interests of a water user.
(Br. of Appellees at 22.)
Defendants
argue, "Not just any cause of action is a protected property interest."
"In order to be a protected property interest," they continue, "the

cause of action must be the means by which a claim for a
protected
property
interest
is asserted
or otherwise protected
from deprivation."
(Br. of Appellees at 22 (emphasis added).) And yet the entire premise
of Part I of Defendants' response brief is that filing a protest before
the State Engineer is the only means of legitimately preserving a cause
of action to protect one's water rights.
"By failing to file his
protest with the State Engineer in a timely manner, Longley did not
comply with the statutes and regulations governing administrative
proceedings before the State Engineer.
Participation
in
the

administrative
proceedings before the State Engineer is a
precedent to seeking judicial
review of the State Engineer's
(Br.

condition
orders."

of Appellees at 12 (emphasis added).)
Thus Defendants represent in one breath that Mr. Longley should be
denied standing because his failure to file a timely protest
extinguished the only legitimate means he had to preserve his interests
but in the other breath assert that Longley's right to protest and
subsequent
right
of
appeal
are
not
within
the
bundle
of
constitutionally protected property interests of water users. This,
despite their recognition that "the means by which a claim for a
protected property interest is asserted or otherwise protected from
deprivation," is constitutionally protected.
(Br. of Appellees at
22.)
Of course, Defendants self-contradict even this point by
75837 L0589 001
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Finally, Defendants' argument that the right to protest is merely
some sort of public relations or public input device, (Br. of Appellees
at 26), means the State Engineer could arbitrarily strip individuals of
the right to protest or disregard protests with impunity.

The State

Engineer could, under Defendants' reasoning, approve new applications
that over-appropriate a stream or approve change applications that
alter use from a 70% return flow to a 100% consumptive use without
extending the right to protest to downstream or senior water users.
The

fact

remains

that

the

right

to

protest

is

the

Utah

legislature's recognition of the constitutional right to be heard. Just
as the right to be heard is meaningless without first receiving proper
notice; proper notice without a subsequent opportunity to be heard is
also meaningless.
aspect

of

the

"The constitutional right to be heard is a basic

duty

of

decisionmaking . . . ."

government

to

follow

a

fair

process

of

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972),

reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902

(Oct. 10, 1972) .

"The purpose of this

requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual.
Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of
property from arbitrary encroachment--to minimize substantively unfair
or mistaken deprivations . . . ."

Id. at 80-81.

"There [is] no longer

any doubt that the right to be heard . . . is . . . essential to due
process."

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51, n.8 (1987).

This Court

asserting that "Longley is not without a remedy to protect his water
rights should the need arise,'' because Longley can bring a cause of
action in district court "[i]f the actual diversion and use of water by
a junior appropriator interferes with [his] water rights." (Br. of
Appellees at 22 n.6.) However, "The claim of denial of due process of
law is not foreclosed by the availability of either administrative or
state remedial measures." Nelson v. Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist,,
845 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (D.S.D. 1994).
75837 LO589.001
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must reject Defendants' spurious contention that Utah's water code is
driven more by public relations concerns than constitutional concerns.
To

accept

this

would

constitutional content.

be

to

strip

Utah's

water

code

of

any

" [I]n this arid state, where a drop of water

is a drop of gold," this would be a drastic mistake.

Carbon Canal Co.

v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n. 19 Utah 2d 6, 425 P.2d 407-08 (1967) .

2.

Defendants

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized
that the water
rights of other persons are at risk or can be
adversely
affected
by an extension request
proceeding.
rely

heavily--as

they

must--on

the

1944

case

of

Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748 (1944) to buttress
their overly broad and singular assertion that the State Engineer
cannot conceivably affect any water rights in any proceeding.

However,

Whitmore is distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case was
"aware of [the change application] but did not protest."

Id.

It is

undisputed that Mr. Longley was not aware of Leucadia's application
until after the time for taking protests had expired.

(R. 354-55.)

Furthermore, United States and Utah Supreme Court decisions in the past
53

years

reasoning.

have

drastically

undermined

the

validity

of

Whitmore's

For example, in United States v. District Court, 121 Utah

1, 238 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1951) (hereinafter "District Court I"). reh'g
denied, 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 (1952) (hereinafter "District Court
IX"), the Utah Supreme Court recognized:
The administration of the waters of the western arid states
present many vital and complicated problems. The right to the use
of water, although a property right, is very different from the
ownership of specific property which is subject to possession,
control and use as the owner sees fit.
Such right does not
involve the ownership of a specific body of water but is only a
right to use a given amount of the transitory waters of a stream
or water source for a specified time, place and purpose, and a

75837 L0589 001
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change in any of these might materially
users of the same stream or source.
*

*

affect

the rights

of

other

•

The State Engineer's decisions[]
often have the effect
of
determining valuable rights....
His decisions require notice to
all interested persons who may protest, whereupon the Engineer
must investigate and hear evidence of all interested parties and
he should approve or reject applications to appropriate, and
applications for a change and issue or deny certificates that such
applications have been accomplished in accordance with the law and
the facts as he finds them. . . . Thus the decision
of
the

Engineer

. .

.

[has]

the

effect

of

establishing

or

denying

valuable
rights
but such decisions, except where the issuance of
a certificate of appropriation or change is involved do not
purport to have the effect of adjudicating
the right to the use of
water . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus the Utah Supreme Court subsequently undermined its holding in
Whitmore
adjudicate

by

recognizing
water

rights,

that
his

while

the

decisions

consequence of affecting valuable rights.5

State
often

Engineer
have

the

does

not

practical

This recognition by the Utah

5

The Court recognized this distinction in a series of opinions
shortly following Whitmore.
In those cases, the Court distinctly
recognized that approval of applications to change water can injure the
vested rights of other users. See, e.g., District Court II, 242 P. 2d
at 777 (recognizing adjudication/impairment distinction; Salt Lake City
v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n, 2 Utah 2d 141, 270 P.2d 453, 455
(1954) (same; recognizing impairment of vested rights possible); East
Bench Irrigation Co. v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d
449, 453-55 (1954) (same); East Bench Irrigation Co. v. State, 5 Utah
2d 235, 300 P.2d 603, 607 (1956) (on appeal from engineer's decision,
court "must adjudicate whether a foreseeable possible effect will
constitute an impairment of vested rights").
That the result of a
State Engineer proceeding on a change application may injure vested
rights of other water users was recognized in Crafts v. Hansen. 667
P.2d 1068 (Utah 1983), where the court reversed a summary judgment
because there were disputed material issues of facts as to whether
there was reasonable cause to believe other rights would not be
impaired by approval. Id. at 1081. Justice Oaks dissented, citing
Whitmore, and commented
By reversing the district court and remanding this case for
trial to resolve issues of fact on the existence of "reason to
75837 L0589 001
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Supreme Court, coupled with the United States Supreme Court's expansion
of

the core of

constitution

interests considered

in

the

1970s,6

"property" under the

indicates

that

Whitmoref s

federal
rigidly

formalistic and simplistic approach, which essentially required a water
user to be stripped of his legal claim to water before being deemed to
have suffered a deprivation of property, would not be sustainable under
modern principles of due process.
water--not a water right--is

Risk of a real world deprivation of

all that is required to state a claim for

an unconstitutional deprivation.7

"If the state prevents you from

entering your house it deprives you of your property right even if the
fee simple remains securely yours.
but

the

right

of

exclusive

use

A property

and

right

enjoyment."

is not

bare

title,

Reed v. Village of

Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). Accord
Mennonite

Bd.

of

Missions,

462

U.S.

at

798

(holding

tax

sale

believe,lf the majority effectively
. . . telescopes an
interlocutory administrative determination on a change application
into a mini-adjudication of vested rights.
Seen in a larger
context, this is just one more instance where the law is
being
changed
....
Id. at 1081 (citing Whitmore) and 1082 (Oaks, J., dissenting).
6

This expansion is well-documented. See, e.g. Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 10-9, at 685 (1988) ("During the early
1970's, the circle of interests sufficient to create 'liberty' or
'property' for purposes of due process was significantly widened.")
7

Mr. Longley well understands that the Leucadia extension
proceeding could not strip away the legal title to his water rights.
That is not his concern. His concern is how the extension will affect
his ability to divert his full entitlement of water. (R. 352-55.) Of
course, as Defendants correctly point out, the only way for Mr. Longley
to safeguard his rights is to protest the extension by showing the
applicant failed to exercise diligence and failed to make a proper
showing of reasonable cause for delay. (Br. of Appellees at 25.)
75837 L0589 001
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"diminishes the value of a [mortgagee's] security interest by granting
the

tax-sale

"nullification"

purchaser
of

a

lien

mortgagee's

with

legal

priority"

interest

has

even
not

though

occurred).

Likewise, if a decision of the State Engineer would have the practical
effect of preventing a water user from receiving

the quantity or

quality of water to which he is entitled, he deprives that user of his
property right even if the purely legal right to use water remains
unadjudicated and, therefore, legally unaffected.
Furthermore, since Whitmore, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized
the

drastic

impact

repeated

extensions,

Extension, can have on other water users.

such

as Leucadia's

Fifth

For example, in Carbon Canal

Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 19 Utah 2d 6, 425 P.2d 405 (1967),
the Court reversed a trial court's judgment granting an extension
request to Sanpete Water Users Association.

Sanpete, like Leucadia,

had filed several extension requests, thereby extending the time to put
its water to beneficial use and effectively "tying up" that amount of
water "for over a quarter century," allegedly to the detriment of the
protestant, Canal Co.

The Court commented,

"Sanpete's successful extensions for decades . . . impel this
court . . . to canvass the facts to determine if, in this arid
state, where a drop of water is a drop of gold, one, by extension
after extension, may equitably prevent beneficial use of water by
others through procedural stagnation for about forty years. We
think not . . . ." Id. at 407-08.
The Utah Supreme Court therefore not only expressly recognized that
"extension after extension [] may . . . prevent beneficial use of water
by others" but also recognized the inequity of such a situation and
expressly disallowed it.

Id.8

8

See also Blake v. Lambert, 590 P.2d 351, 352 (Utah 1979) ("Water,
in an arid state like Utah, is its life-blood, measured in currency
75837 L0589 001
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3.

Defendants
cannot demonstrate
as a matter
of law
that
the water rights
of users
from the same water
source
cannot
conceivably
be harmed by any decision
of
the
State Engineer
"under any scenario
advanced."

There are several scenarios under which approval of an extension
application could drastically affect the water rights of others on the
same source.
cfs

when

For example, assume application A was made in 1957 for 25

100

appropriation.

cfs

was

flowing

in

It is now 1997.

a

stream

and

available

for

Applications B, C, and D, in that

order, were made in the intervening 4 0 years, giving B, C, and D each
junior rights to 25 cfs in addition to A's senior right, thereby fully
appropriating the 100 cfs flowing in the stream.

However, since 1957

stream flow has diminished to just 70 cfs and now, after 40 years of
delay, A seeks another extension on his 25 cfs.
granted,

A,

being

a senior, can

appropriation doctrine

in effect

in the

future, under

the

prior

in Utah, use his entire 25 cfs,

leaving 45 cfs in the stream for B, C, and D.
25 cfs.

If the extension is

B can still receive his

But once A begins using the water, C has just been permanently

deprived of 5 cfs and D has lost the practical ability to divert water
altogether.9

On the other hand, had C and D protested A's extension

represented by survival itself,—without a high degree of equitable
justification for protracted extension."); See In re Determination of
Relative Rights to Use of Waters of Deschutes River, 108 P.2d 276, 284
(Ore. 1940) (Oregon Supreme Court retracted "statement [in a prior
opinion] that the granting of an extension of time . . . within which
to complete the application of water to a beneficial use could not in
any way affect the adjudicated rights of other claimants").
9

It is therefore shortsighted and overly simplistic for Defendants
to maintain "when the State Engineer approves an extension request, all
other water rights continue as originally approved; the same quantity
of water may be diverted under the same priority date, from the same
point of diversion, at the same place of use, and for the same nature
of use. . . . They are not adversely affected in any way."
(Br. of
75837 L0589 001
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application and demonstrated A f s lack of diligence lapse and C and D
would suffer no deprivation.10
Assuming the same facts as above, assume further that A's last
extension request was denied and no action was taken by the State
Engineer upon a request for rehearing, thereby deeming the application
lapsed.

Relying on the public records, which reflected

that the

application for extension had lapsed, C and D prudently invest hundreds
of thousands of dollars to improve their respective diversion and
distribution facilities and change their farming methods, relying on
the fact that they would now be able to utilize their water rights to
the fullest extent possible.11

Thinking that A is now out of the

picture, and that C can divert his full 25 cfs and D can divert the
remaining 20 cfs in the stream, D now learns that A's extension request
had been unlawfully reinstated after a hearing preceded by defective
public notice.

A now has the right to put 25 cfs to beneficial use

Appellees at 18.) While it is true that the paper rights of C and D
are not adversely impacted in any way, C and D' s real world ability of
use and enjoyment has been emasculated.
10

The scenario of an intervening drought or other changes in the
water supply over the course of many years is not mere conjecture in an
arid state like Utah. It is, perhaps, for this reason that section 733-12 allows the State Engineer to approve extensions without notice or
right to protest within 14 years of application but requires notice and
the right to protest for extensions beyond that date. See Utah Code
Ann. § 73-3-12(1)(d) (1989). There is a significant likelihood that a
water supply has changed 14 years after an application was filed.
11

Of course, C and D realize that upon denial of A's application
the waters which A would have been entitled to theoretically revert to
the state.
But, being two of only three appropriators, each with
rights to 25 cfs, on a stream that is now over appropriated (70 cfs of
water available but 75 cfs in approved applications) C and D realize
that there is no more water left for appropriation to citizens of the
state and that the waters of the stream, as a practical matter, are
theirs for appropriation. And even if the State Engineer approved more
rights on the same source those rights would be junior to C and D's.
75837 L0589 001
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and, should A do so, D f s

farming operation and investments incident

thereto are irretrievably lost.

As illustrated, Defendants' assertion

that a decision of the State Engineer cannot affect other water users'
water rights "under any scenario advanced" is false.
C.

Mr. Longley's Water Rights Were Adversely Affected by the
State Engineer's Illegal Approval of Leucadia's Unlawful and
Untimely Extension Request.

A water source has a fixed capacity, like seating in a theater.
And water users, like anxious theater goers, line up for the right to
enjoy a share of the fixed resource.

One's place in line determines

the extent to which he or she may enjoy the resource.

He who is "first

in time is first in right" and therefore enjoys the superior right.
District Court I. 238 P.2d at 1136.
of

seats available

Of course, with a limited number

for a one-time-only performance, no one

could

seriously doubt the injury that other theater goers might suffer by
allowing one who has been rightfully removed from the line to cut back
in ahead of others.

This is particularly true of theater goers who

were theretofore behind the cutter and when the rules of the theater
state that a theater goer must go to the very back of the line if he
has not followed theater rules.

Likewise, "in this arid state, where

a drop of water is a drop of gold," Carbon Canal Co. 425 P.2d

at 407-

08, and priority is the essence of a water right, District Court I, 238
P. 2d at 113 6, no court should seriously doubt the injury that other
water users might

suffer by allowing one who has been

removed from the line to cut back in.
462

U.S.

at

constitutionally

75837 L0589 001
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(holding

protected

tax

property

15

rightfully

See Mennonite Bd. of Missions,
sale

deprived

interest

mortgagee

because

the

of
sale

"diminishe[d] the value of [mortgagee's] security interest by granting
the tax-sale purchaser a lien with priority").
A junior water user is also analogous to a junior mortgagee.

Both

have rights in a limited resource--a home or a water source--but do not
have legal title to the resource.

Both have rights that are junior or

inferior to rights of those whose rights are prior in time.

Therefore,

both run the risk of being deprived of the practical realization of
their "paper" rights.12
mortgagee

is

entitled

For this reason, courts have held that a junior
to

due

process

protections.

See

Island

Financial, Inc. v. Ballman, 607 A.2d 76, 79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)
(a junior mortgagee, which did not

receive

foreclosure, was entitled to actual notice
the

foreclosure

sale has the ultimate

notice

of

a

senior's

because "ratification of

effect

of nullifying

[its]

interest in the property" even though a surplus of $321.33 existed
after foreclosure of the first trust deed).
A junior mortgagee, who had supplanted a senior mortgagee when the
senior's interest had terminated by operation of law, would obviously

12

For example, if a water source was limited to 120 cfs at the
time the junior water user acquired his water right for 20 cfs, subject
to the 100 cfs right of a prior appropriator, but the water source is
reduced to 100 cfs, the junior water user obtains no water though his
paper right remains in tact. Likewise, if a home was worth $120,000.00
at the time the junior mortgagee acquired his $20,000.00 interest
subject to the $100,000.00 interest of the prior mortgagee, but is only
worth $100,000.00 at the time of foreclosure, the junior mortgagee
obtains nothing from the foreclosure proceeds even though his paper
rights are not taken from him.
Given the sensitive nature of the
junior mortgagee and water user's rights, each would have a vested
interest in receiving notice of any proceeding that might affect the
rights of the senior.
If the rights of the senior are somehow
eliminated or lapsed, the right of the junior is obviously a much more
valuable right as a result. On the other hand, even if the senior
rights are not somehow eliminated, any assertion by the senior of those
rights has a drastic real world impact on the rights of the junior.
75837 L0589 001
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be adversely affected or deprived of a valuable interest in proceedings
wherein

the

senior

asserted

that

his

interest

was

not

actually

extinguished and should remain intact.

See Mennonite Bd. of Missions,

462

priority

U.S.

at

798

(deprivation

of

without

notice

is

unconstitutional). This is the essence of Mr. Longley's complaint,
wherein it is alleged that Leucadia was rightfully removed from line
but was allowed to cut back in through the illegal action of the State
Engineer, (R. 160-67).13

Leucadia's water rights lapsed as a matter of

law when it failed to submit verified proof of appropriation on or
before November 30, 1989.

(R. 42-47, 163, 331.)

The State Engineer

had no authority or power to resurrect Leucadia's water right by a
purported Fifth Extension Request filed on September 21, 1990, a full
ten months after Leucadia's water rights lapsed as a matter of law.
(R. 52, 58-59, 163-65.)

In Baugh v. Criddle. 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d

790 (1967), a water user's predecessor had, like Leucadia, been granted
l

an extension request under a similar statute and, like Leucadia, on the
eve

of

the

appropriation.

extension

deadline

Id. at 791.

submitted

unverified

proof

of

The Utah Supreme Court held that the water

right had lapsed under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 when verified proof was
not submitted by the deadline.

Id.

The Court held that the statute

mandated that the application lapse and that the State Engineer lacked
authority to alter this result.

Id.

13

Thus, Defendants' assertion that "When the State Engineer
decides that due diligence or reasonable cause for delay has not been
shown and that an application must lapse, the State Engineer's decision
may indirectly benefit other appropriators. . . . [but] does not
adversely affect their water rights," (Br. of Appellee's at 18),
severely misses the point by completely ignoring the facts of this
case.
75837.LO589.001

17

The Court further held that statutory provisions like section 731-4 and 73-3-12 "should be strictly construed," id. (quoting Kinney,
Irrigation and Water Rights, 2d ed., 1912, Vol. 2, § 1120), because
"[i]n this arid state, where water is the heartbeat of our economy,
more and more it becomes quite obvious that development of water must
require strict adherence to statutory sanctions, without delay or nonconformance thereto,--lest our whole economy lag to the detriment of
our

future,"

Id.

The principles of Baugh, which dealt with the

forfeiture of water rights that had been proved up, demonstrate that
under section 73-3-12 failure to submit proof that water has been put
to beneficial use by the stipulated deadline for doing so lapses the
application

by

operation

of

law

and,

consequently,

deprives the applicant of any right to water.

automatically

Therefore, when Leucadia

failed to submit verified proof by the appropriate deadline, (R. 42-47,
163) , its water application lapsed by operation of law and the State
Engineer had no authority to resurrect that right as he did in this
case.14

The unlawful actions of both Leucadia and the State Engineer to

14

Even if he did have such authority and the right was
resurrected after its November 30, 1989 death, (R. 42-47, 163),
Leucadia's right suffered a second death because the State Engineer
took no action on Leucadia's request for reconsideration on or before
August 19, 1992, a date 20 days from the time Leucadia's request for
reconsideration was received, (R. 52, 164). See Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-13(3)(b) (emphasis added) ("If the agency . . . does not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for
reconsideration shall
be considered to be denied.") Defendants
mislead the Court with their representation that both the Utah
Supreme Court and this Court have held that "state agencies may act
on requests for reconsideration beyond the 20-day period."
(Br. of
Appellees at 28 n.12.) Neither Harper Inv., Inc. v. Auditing Div..
868 P.2d 813, 815-16 (Utah 1994) nor 49th Street Galleria v. Tax
Comm'n, 860 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied 878 P.2d
1154 (Utah 1994), can be read so broadly. Instead, both cases dealt
with proper tolling of the 30-day appeal period and held that the 30day period is not triggered until the latter of the following: (1)
75837 L0589 001
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resurrect that right effectively allowed Leucadia to cut back in line
when other water users, like Mr. Longley, had already, by operation of
law, moved ahead.
Mr.

Longley

Accordingly, under the peculiar facts of this case,

could have been

Engineer's unlawful action.
II.

injured by Leucadia's

and

the

State

(R. 159, 172, 353-55, 562, 564-65, 567.)

THE PUBLISHED NOTICE OF LEUCADIA'S EXTENSION REQUEST WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY INADEQUATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, DEFECTIVE ON
ITS FACE, AND FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW.
A.

Notice by Publication Was Constitutionally Inadequate Under
the Circumstances and Constitutionally Defective On Its Face.

This Court must start with the premise that notice by publication
is generally disfavored and that Defendants' "justification" of this
method "is difficult at best,"
344

U.S.

293,

296

(1953),

New York v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.,
particularly

under

the

facts

and

circumstances of this case.15
Defendants1
constitutional

sole

justification

for

eclipsing

Mr.

rights--that because the State Engineer

Longley's
administers

the date on which an order or denial was issued or (2) the date on
which an order was deemed to have been denied. See Harper, 868 P.2d
at 815-16. "[I]f an agency chooses to issue an order denying
a
petition for reconsideration after the twenty-day presumptive denial
period, the actual date of issuance would mark the beginning of the
thirty-day time period." Id. at 816 (emphasis added). Neither case
holds that the agency may approve a petition for reconsideration
after the twenty-day presumptive denial period.
15

Nothing in the Utah Supreme Court's recent opinion in V-l Oil
Company v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997)
alters the constitutional analysis this Court should utilize.
The
proper constitutional standards are clearly set forth in Part I.B. of
Mr. Longley's initial brief and are incorporated herein by this
reference.
The V-l Oil court simply recognized the Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), balancing approach adopted more
than 20 years ago by the United States Supreme Court and discussed at
page 20 of Mr. Longley's initial brief.
75837 L0589 001
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approximately 120,000 water rights individual notice to water users
would be "overwhelmingly burdensome"

(Br. of Appellees at 29)--is a

misleading red herring that must be rejected for a number of reasons.
First, water users often own more than one right from the same source
of supply.

For example, a single water user may hold 50 water rights.

Therefore, notice to water rights holders

is all that would be required

and would be much less burdensome than Defendants suggest.

Second, the

State Engineer would not be required to give actual notice to all water
users in the state any time he took action.
would

be

given

information

only

making

to

those

their

ascertainable; and

who:

(1)

whereabouts

Instead, actual notice

request
and

it;

(2)

identity

provide

reasonably

(3) could be affected adversely by his decision

(e.g., only those who hold water rights in the same source of supply).
The number of persons conforming to these criteria would be a mere
fraction of 120,000.
Third, Defendants cannot dispute that other agencies in this state
provide notice of their proceedings to all who request it.
Appellant at 26 & n.13.)
more

populous

administrative

than

Fourth, they cannot dispute that states much

Utah

proceedings

Appellant at 25-26.)

(See Br. of

are
to

reguired

all

who

to

request

provide
it.

notice
(See

of

Br. of

Fifth, and finally, Defendants cannot dispute

that Mr. Longley's name and address were reasonably ascertainable, and
that

he--and

application.

only

he--requested

actual

notice

of

this

particular

(Br. of Appellees at 7; R. 330-31, 353-54, 365, 515, 530,

556-57, 562-63, 565-67.)16

16

The State Engineer maintains a file on each water right. Mr.
Longley's request for actual notice was placed in the file for
75837 L0589 001
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Therefore, Defendants cannot dispute the conclusion that the cost
of one sheet of paper, one envelope, and one stamp, should not outweigh
Mr. Longley's constitutional right to receive adequate notice.17

There

is no risk of destabilizing water rights in this State by requiring
that actual notice be given to those water users from the same source
of supply who request it, as Defendants' spuriously contend.
Appellees at 29-30.)

(Br. of

This system of providing actual notice has not

destabilized the water rights in Colorado or Nebraska.
Stat. § 37-92-302 (3) (b) , and

(c) (1990)

See Colo. Rev.

(requiring that state give

notice of changes or applications affecting water rights to those it
"has reason to believe would be affected or who [have] requested the
same by submitting his name and address to the water clerk")/ Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 46-238(2) (1996) (requiring notice of an extension request to
be given to "any person who requests notification of the [extension]
hearing").

It has not destabilized the numerous other Utah agencies

who follow such a policy.

(See Br. of Appellant at 26 & n.13.)

The

essence of Defendants' objection to an actual notice requirement is
this:
. . .

"If such a duty were found to exist by reason of due process .
[s]uch a task is . . . contrary to the reasonable procedures

outlined by the Legislature."

(Br. of Appellees at 29.)

However, when

legislated administrative convenience inadequately safeguards sacred
constitutional protections, the legislation must yield.

Leucadia's water right. There is no burden on the State Engineer to
give actual notice to those persons who have a request for such notice
placed in the file of a particular water right.
17

The State Engineer could also charge an administrative fee to
those desiring such notice.
75837 L0589 00!
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Moreover, as demonstrated in Part I above, Leucadia's failure to
file verified proof by November 30, 1989, (R. 42-47, 163) or the State
Engineer's

July

10,

1992

Memorandum

Decision

lapsing

the

Change

Application, (R. 49-50), and the automatic denial of the Request for
Reconsideration of that decision, (R. 164), dissolved Leucadia's water
right by operation of law and sent notice to all water users from the
same source of supply that Leucadia had been bumped out of line and
stripped of

its priority date.

Baugh, 431 P.2d

at 791-92.

The

Defendants' subsequent attempts to resurrect this lapsed right were
unlawful.

But, even

assuming

the

lawfulness

of

these

attempts,

Defendants were constitutionally required to take more drastic steps to
notify interested persons of this unusual action, particularly in the
event that water users had detrimentally relied on the State Engineer's
decisions lapsing Leucadia's right.

(See Br. of Appellant at 23-24.)

Finally, for the reasons explained in Part II.B. below, which is
incorporated herein by this reference, the published notice itself was
constitutionally defective on its face.

Therefore, even if this Court

were to conclude that Mr. Longley was not entitled to actual notice
under the circumstances, it would still need to reverse the trial
court's decision because the published notice itself was not reasonably
calculated to inform interested parties of the pending state action.
B,

Although Strict Compliance is Required, The April 1994 Notice
Does Not Even Substantially Comply with Statutory Notice
Requirements•

Under this Court's holding in Badger v. Madsen. 896 P.2d 20, 23
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah
1995) , strict compliance is required even if the failure to adhere to
notice requirements could just "possibly
75837 L0589 001
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prejudice" that person.

And

this Court also held in W&G Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 755,
761 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added) that "the potential to harm
individual property rights" necessitated strict compliance.

Since Mr.

Longley is more than possibly or potentially affected by an illegal
extension request, strict compliance is required.

2.

The property
descriptions
statutorily
defective and

Id.18

in the published
inadequate.

notice

Even if Mr. Longley studiously perused the pages of The

Manual of Style

or the New York Public Library Writer's

were
Chicago

Guide to

Style

and Usage he still would not have been able to understand the cryptic
April 1994 notice.

Defendants' maintain that the April 1994 notice

listed the well sites "in the form of a sentence that used punctuation
very purposefully."19 Defendants' "sentence"20 is nothing of the sort.

18

The case of Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d 480, 482-83
(Utah 1980), cited by Defendants, (Br. of Appellees at 42), is
inapposite because it involved a notice of claim statute whereby a
plaintiff's claim for personal injury was threatened to be extinguished
for not presenting notice of his claim to the proper authority in
precisely the prescribed manner. Conversely, in the case at bar, the
Defendants—not
the plaintiff—had a statutory charge to provide notice
so Plaintiff could safeguard his rights and not forfeit his cause of
action to defend those rights. Stahl is simply irrelevant and animated
by different policy concerns.
The quoted excerpt, (Br. of Appellees at 42), from Defendants'
only other cited authority, Felida Neighborhood Assoc, v. Clark County,
913 P.2d 823, 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), review denied, 922 P.2d 98
(Wash. 1996), actually supports Mr. Longley's position. "Failure to
satisfy the notice requirements . . . is excused where substantial
compliance resulted
in full and adequate notice."
Id. (emphasis
added). It is undisputed that the April 1994 notice did not result in
notice to Mr. Longley, (R. 354-55), therefore the notice did not even
substantially comply with statutory requirements
19

Defendants assert:

In his brief, Longley lists the proposed
diversion in a form that is misleading.
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new points of
(See Br. of

The first of these "important and sometimes multiple purposes" was
"to

separate

the

references

to

the

individual

wells,

indicated by serial numbers enclosed within parentheses.
declare

the Defendants,

which

are

This,"21

"is a very common style of usage."

Id.

Appellant at 9, 29 n.16.)
The points of diversion as
published were not listed in a table, they were listed in the
form of a sentence that used punctuation very purposefully.
Longley's tabular listing misleadingly isolates the courses
and distances for the individual diversion points and deemphasizes the punctuation used. While tabular listing is
convenient for comparison purposes, Longley's tabular listing
is inaccurate because it distorts the actual published
notice.
(Br. of Appellees at 38 n.16.)
In the interests of credibility, Mr. Longley would like to point
out that Defendants' statement "The points of diversion as published
were not listed in a table, they were listed in the form of a sentence
that used punctuation very purposefully" should have a semicolon in it
rather than a comma. See, e.g.. The Chicago Manual of Style
§ 5.8 9 at
181 (14th ed. 1993).
Also,
Defendants'
argument
about
Mr. Longley's
vertical
presentation of the list being misleading is specious. It is not a
"table" at all. See, e.g., id. chap. 12 "Tables." It is a
series
(also called an enumeration),
presentable in either "run-in" style (as
in the 1994 notice) or "list" style (as in Mr. Longley's brief). See
id. at §§ 5.57-5.61 & 8.75-8.77. The differences are-at least, they
are supposed to be—purely stylistic; it's not supposed to make any
difference which way the series is presented, and either way is
correct.
See id. at §§ 5.61 & 8.76.
The 1994 notice ought
to be
intelligible in either form.
20

It runs as follows:

POD: Same as Heretofore,
wells 0 to 800 ft. deep:
from NW Cor, Sec 25, (3)
66, (5) S 2343 W 50 from
Cor, Sec 26, T42S, R14W.

but adding the following 16 in.
(1) S 50 E 2531, (2) S 2343 E 253
S 50 E 50 from NW Cor, (4) S 50 W
NE Cor, (6) S 2343 E 2970 from NW

21

This,
in this sentence, has multiple (and therefore ambiguous)
antecedents: separation by commas, "serial" numbers (i.e., numbers in
a series), and parentheses around such numbers.
Page 173 of the
Chicago
Manual,
however, to which Defendants cite, discusses only
separation by commas.
75837 L0589 001
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Defendants cite to page 173 of The Chicago
1993)

(the "Chicago

Manual")

only general comma usage.

Manual

of

Style

(14th ed.

for support; page 173, however, covers

The correct citation is § 8.75 on page 313:

Enumerations that are run into the text may be indicated by
numerals or italic letters in parentheses. In a simple series
with little or no punctuation within each item, separation by
commas is sufficient. Otherwise,
semicolons
are
used.
(emphasis added); See also id. at §§ 5.59 & 5.94

("when items in a

series . . . involve internal punctuation, they should be separated by
semicolons for the sake of clarity"). Thus, not only should

there be a

semicolon between "Sec 25" and "(3)," for Defendants' interpretation to
make any sense at all, the rules of punctuation would require
Commas

were

also

used,

assert

Defendants,

"to

one.

indicate

the

omission of words that are understood by the context of the sentence"
(Br. of Appellees at 38

(citing Chicago

Manual

at 176)), and "to

separate elements that grammatically belonged to two or more wells, but
were expressed only after the last well"
(paraphrasing
Usage

New York

Public

255 (1994) (the "New York

Library
Guide"))).

(Br. of Appellees at 39

Writer's

Guide

to

Style

What the New York

and
Guide

actually says, however, is this:
A comma is placed before an element that grammatically
belongs to two or more phrases
but is expressed only after
the last one.
New York

Guide

at 255 (emphasis added).

are not grammatical phrases.

Defendants' well descriptions

They are adverbials of place, designating

the locations of six "16 in. wells 0 to 800 ft. deep."
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Their structure

is entirely distinct

from the New

York

Guide's

"4-day work week"

to

1994

example cited by Defendants.22
An

example

demonstrate

the

structurally
inadequacy

identical
of

Defendants'

the

notice

grammatical

will

position.

Suppose you send a runner for a number of books, then modify the list,
sending the new list after him:
Same books as on the previous list, but adding the following:
(1) third from the left, (2) tenth from the left on the top
shelf, first bookcase, (3) seventh from the left on the top
shelf, (4) second from the left, (5) fifth from the left on
the third shelf, (6) eighth from the left on the top shelf,
second bookcase, over on the east wall of the University of
Utah law library.
The descriptions of books 1 and 4, of course, are hopeless: your runner
is standing in the middle of a library, surrounded by books which can
be identified as "second from the left" or "third from the left."
Assuming, however, that he somehow surmounts this obstacle, should he
assume, as Defendants argue, that book 1 is on the top shelf of the
first bookcase?
"first bookcase"?

Why?

Because the description of book 2 mentions a

A proper list, of course, would state somehow that

both books 1 and 2 came from the first bookcase - - b y repeating it in
each description, or by putting "first bookcase" as a heading.

22

See Appendix A The description (repeated here for convenience)
POD: Same as Heretofore, but adding the following 16 in. wells 0
to 800 ft. deep: (1) S 50 E 2531, (2) S 2343 E 253 from NW Cor,
Sec 25, (3) S 50 E 50 from NW Cor, (4) S 50 W 66, (5) S 2343 W 50
from NE Cor, (6) S 2343 E 2970 from NW Cor, Sec 26, T42S, R14W.
contains neither subject nor predicate; indeed, the only verb in the
entire provision is the gerund "adding," and the only nouns are "wells"
and the unstated "point" in POD.
Of course, neither noun is the
subject of any sentence.
There is
no sentence— just a brief
appositive,
"same
as
heretofore,"
and
a
lengthy
gerund
phrase—comprising the rest of the description—the object of which is
"wells"; the rest is adverbial locatives.
75837 L0589 001
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From Defendants' argument, one must infer that the "top shelf" in
the description of book 3 refers to the top shelf of the second
bookcase, referenced in the description of book 6; but why doesn't it
mean the top shelf of the first

bookcase, as in book 2's description?

There is no good reason to group book 3 with book 6; there isn't even
a semicolon between book 2 and book 3 to indicate that they don't go
together, or that different groupings exist.

In fact, there is no

reason even to suspect that any of the books except book 6 are located
on any but

the first bookcase since only book 6's description says

anything about it.

Nor does any of the descriptions (again excepting

book 6's) say anything about the east wall of the library.
The vagueness of this addendum to the earlier list makes it
practically useless: no one could correctly locate these books without
extraordinary

luck; the data given are simply insufficient. These

objections apply with equal validity to the structure of the 1994
notice:
POD: Same as Heretofore,
wells 0 to 800 ft. deep:
from NW Cor, Sec 25, (3)
66, (5) S 2343 W 50 from
Cor, Sec 26, T42S, R14W.

but adding the following 16 in.
(1) S 50 E 2531, (2) S 2343 E 253
S 50 E 50 from NW Cor, (4) S 50 W
NE Cor, (6) S 2343 E 2970 from NW

As with our book example, descriptions 1 and 4 are hopeless: we have no
idea where to measure them from; Defendants' reassurance that the
necessary information can be found tacked on at the end, as we have
seen, is neither grammatically sound nor rhetorically sensible.
Why should anyone assume that well 1 is to be measured from the
northwest corner of section 25?

And since well 3 clearly states "from

NW Cor," can it not be reasonably assumed that the northwest corner of
section 25 is meant, as in the description of well 2?
75837 L0589 001
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There is nothing

to stop us inferring that well 5 is in the northeast corner of section
25, nor any good reason to conclude that any well except number 6 is in
section 26 at all.

Moreover, the fact that well 6 appears to be in

township 42 south of range 14 west says nothing whatever about the
locations of wells 1 through 5.

The import of the reader being able to

determine the location of the wells is obvious.

A well 500 feet from

your water source is of much greater concern than one five miles away.
It is curious that the State Engineer employed this awkward, ambiguous,
and confusing format, especially in light of the fact that such notice
has in the past been quite clear.23

However, because he has done so,

the notice is defective and fails to comport with minimum requirements
of due process and section 73-3-12.

2.

See W&G, 802 P.2d at 762.

The published notice did not inform the public of the
diligence claimed or the reason for the request.

The published notice did not "inform the public of the diligence
claimed," as required by Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12(1) (e) (ii), for those
reasons set forth in Part II.B.l of Mr. Longley's initial brief.

It

also did not "inform the public of . . . the reason for the request,"

23

Note, for instance, the February 1, 1971, notice on these same
wells (numbered differently):
Hereafter, 6.027 sec.-ft. of water is to be diverted from
each or all of 8 16-in. wells, 0-800 ft. deep as follows: .
. . (S) [sic] 49.5 ft. E. 49.5 ft. from NW Cor. § 26; (4) S.
49.5 ft. W. 66 ft. from NE Cor. § 26; (5) S. 49.5 ft. E. 2531
ft. from NW Cor. § 25; (6) S. 2343 ft. E. 253 ft. from NW
Cor. § 25; (7) S. 2343 ft. W. 49.5 ft. from NE Cor. § 26; (8)
S. 2343 ft. E. 2970 ft. NW Cor. § 26; all T42S, R14W.
Washington County News, St. George, Utah, Feb. 1, 1971 (Appendix B ) .
Here it appears that the State Engineer (Hubert C. Lambert at that
time) had no problem understanding and properly using semicolons; nor
clearly stating the corner and section for each well; nor plainly
declaring that all of them were in township 42 south, range 14 west.
75837 L0589 001

28

id., and Defendants' assertion to the contrary is absurd.

Defendants

argue "the published notice stated that the reason for the request was
"that additional time [was] needed to place the water to beneficial
use. '"

(Br. of Appellee's

at 37.)

In other words,

"we need

an

extension because we need an extension," Defendants assert, satisfies
the statutory requirement that notice of an extension request must
"inform the public of . . . the reason for the [extension] request."
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (1) (e) (ii) (emphasis added). This absurdity
violates nearly every canon of statutory construction and must be
rejected.24
//
//
//
//
//
//
//

24

Defendants' argument would suffice if the notice statute said,
"The notice shall contain information that will inform the public of .
. . the . . . request." However, the statute says, "The notice shall
contain information that will inform the public of . . . the reason for
the request." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-12 (1) (e) (ii) (emphasis added).
Defendants' proffered interpretation requires this court to ignore some
of the statutory language. However, "In the process of interpretation,
courts may not take, strike, or read anything out of a statute or
delete, subtract, or omit anything therefrom." W&G, 802 P.2d at 769
(citations omitted). See also, e.g., Carlie, 922 P.2d at 4 (statutory
provisions should be presumed to have been used advisedly)/ Beaver
County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996) (primary
rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve);
Hunt, 906 P.2d at 312 (interpretation that renders parts of a statute
superfluous is to be avoided).
75837 LO589.001
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the grant of summary judgment by
the district

court must be reversed and this matter remanded

further proceedings.
DATED this [ u

day of December, 1997.

emit

irtvigsen
.lsworth
'McDonald
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX "A"

We approve of, and are willing to participate in, the new
4-day work week.
prove

.fate.

POD; Same as Heretofore, but adding the following
16 in. wells 0 to 800 ft. deep:
(1) S 50 E 2531,
(2) S 2343 E 253 from NW Cor, Sec 25, (3) S 50 E 50
from NW Cor, (4) S 50 W 66, (5) S 2343 W 50 from
NE Cor, (6) 2343 E 2970 from NW Cor, Sec 26, T42S,
R14W.

CO

6p*MCyft
NcJCor- S*c ZL
TWZS
\

RNU)

APPENDIX "B"

STATE DF
MOTfCE TO WATER USERS
I ic following
applications
we been filed with the State
»£»incer to change water in,
ishtngton County, State of
ah, throughout the entire year
•less other designated. Locans in SLB&M.
a-639l lerracor, 529 E. South
Mnple, Salt Lake City, Utah,
ioposes to change the poinT of
version, place and nature of
.c» of 2.0 sec.-ft. of watqr as
idenced by App. 33926- (81»CJ). The water was to have
en diverted from a 16-In. well,
Kl-500 ft. deep at a point N.
>1() ft. W. 1320 ft. from Si'
->r. Sec. 16, T42S, R13VV, and
ed from Ma/ 1 to Dec. 30 f.n
ockwatering of 50 cattle and
om May 1 to Oct. 1 for iniition of 170 acres within WJ4: l /4, NV5SE%sw%. SEV4NW*
.SfcSWV4NWV4. Ni/2NViNW.
SW% Sec 16, T42S, R13W.
Hereafter, 2.0 sec.-ft. of water
to be diverted from each or
of 7 16- in. wells, 0-800 ft
ep as follows: (1) Same as
retofor, (2) S. 49.5 ft E. 49.5
from NW Cor. Sec. 26; (3)
49.5 ft. W. 66 ft. from NE
>r. Sec. 26; (4) S. 49.5 ft E.
31 ft. from NW Cor. Sec. 25;
) S. 2343 ft. E. 253 ft. from
V Cor. Sec. 25; (6) S. 2343
W. 49.5 ft. from NE Cor.
c. 26; (7) S. 2343 ft. E. 2970
from NW Cor. Sec. 26, all
2S, R14W; and Used as hereor in addition to misc. uses
* domestic recreation and instria! purposes within Sees. 5143S, R15W, and Sees. 11-15,*
& 23, T43S, R16W.
1-6392 Terracor, 529 E. South
mple, Salt Lake City, Utah,
>poses to change the point of
ersion, place and nature of
* of 3.0 sec.-ft. of water as
denced by App. No. 35439
-579). The water was to have
^n diverted from a 16-ln. well,
1-200 ft. deep at a point S.
1 ft. E. 1184 ft. from WV4
r. Sec. 9, T43S, R15W, and
* red from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31
means of an earth-filled dam
ft. high creating a reservoir
'ing an 8 ac.-ft. capacity iniaitng I acre; and used for
ckwatering of 200 cattle, supmental irrigation of 300 acres
'bin EV? Sec. 8, and W*/2 Sec.
T43S, R15W.
I
lereafter, 3.0 sec.-ft. of water
I be diverted from 2 wells \
follows: (I) Same as hereto(2) 16-in. well, 0-800 ft.1
-p at a point N. 750 ft. W. x
)0 ft. from EV4 Cor. Sec. 12,'
IS, R16W and stored as here-'
or and used as heretofor deihod in addition to misc. uses
municipal domestic, rccreai and industrial purposes,
Inn S'V

>\

M »S. R l r i \ V

:tn<l

UTAH

DEPARTMENT DF NATURAL RESOURCES

D I V I S I D N DF WATER RIGHTS
442

STATE

SALT L A K E CITY

CAPITOL

CHANGE APPLICATION NO. a-6393

NOTICE TO WATER USE RS PUBLISHED IN:
Washington County News, St. George, Utah on
December 17, 24 & 31, 1970.
PROTEST PERIOD ENDED:
PROTESTED

STATE E N G I N E E R
TELEPHONE

328-5671

UTAH 8 4 1 1 4

February L, 1971
RE:

HUBERT C LAMBERT

January 30, 1971

>1Tft-fcTO JleTracor. E&STfe. South
TempleTSaSlt Lake City, Utah,
proposcV to .change '< the point
df diverslonf*pjace and nature of
use of 6ffp7f4.Sc.-ft. of water as
'evidenced by» App, No. 36856
(81-669) &>36857 (81-670). The
water has Been diverted from 2
wells as'follows: (1) 16-in. well,
55 ft. deep, located N. 1491 ft
E. 155 ft. from.WVi Cor. Sec.
23; (2) 8-ln. well, 45 ft deep,
located S. 100 ft W. 1100 ft
from Ei/4 Cdn Sec. 22; all T43S,
R16W; and stored from Jan. 1
to Dec. 31 by means of an earthfilled^jiarn 10 ft high, creating a,
reservoir having a 10; ac-ft capacity inundating 2 acres; and*
used as* follows: (1) domestic
purposes of 4 families, stock.watering of:200 cattle; (2) domestic purposes of 1 family,
sfockwatering- of 50 swine, 10.
horses* 50 cattleY and 100 poul-;
try; and from >Maiv 1 to Nov.
30 for supplemental-irrigation of
400 acres but limited t6 a sole*
supply on 350 acres%within E*4
Sec. 22, NY2r SWVi' Sec. 23,
T43S, R16W. .
^jt" ;
Hereafter, 6.027 Wc.-ft/of water is to be diverted'from each
or all of 8 16-inV wells, 0-800
ft. deep as follows: "<1 & 2) same
as heretofor, (S) 49.5 ft. E. 49 5
ft. from NW Cor. Sec. 26; (4)
S. 49.5 ft. W. 66 ft. from NE
Cor. Sec. 26; (5) S. 49.5 ft. E.
2531 ft from NW Cor. Sec. 25,
(6) S. 2343 ft. E, 253 ft from
NW Cor. Sec. 25; (7) S. 2343
ft. W. 49.5 ft from NE Cor.
See. 26; (8) S. 2343 ft E. 2970
ft. NW.Cor. SecV 26;. all T42S,
R14W; and stored as heretofor,
and used for domestic purposes,
of 5 families, stockwatering of
250 cattle, 10 horses,.50 swine/
and 100 poultry, in 'addition to
domestic, recreation and industrial uses and from Mar. 1 to
Nov. 30 for supplemental irrigation of 400 acres but limited
to a sole supply of 350 acres
within Sees. 5-8, T43S, R15W,
and Sees. 11-15, 22 & 23, T43S,'
R16W.
Protests resisting the granting
of these applications with rea-,
sons therefor must be filed in"
duplicate with the State Engineer,, 442 State Capitol, Salt
Lake ."City, Utah 84114, on or
before January 31, 1971.
Hubert C. Lambert
STATE ENGINEER
Published in the Washington
County News on December 17,
24, and 31, 1970.
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